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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Rosetta Stone criticizes Google for "cloak(ing] itself in decades of case law," (Dh.i. 147, 
"RS Opp." at 2), but GOQgle believes that it is proper to ask this Court ID apply well-established 
principles of trademark law in resolving the question presented for summary judgment: whether 
on the present record Rosetta Stone can prove that Google has infringed. 
Rosetta Stone argues thet Google's advertising program must infringe beca.use it involve:; 
the "sale" of Rosetta Stone's trademarks and their use within ad text Under its theory. Rosetta 
Stone need not prove anything else, i.e., it need not demonstrate that any given advertisement or 
search results page is likely to confuse consumers. Rosetta Stone's infringement case against 
Google focuses on Google's business model as a whole, and is premised on (he belief that 
liability can be imposed without assessing any actual ads displayed by Google. Indeed, the only 
actual ads Rosetta Stone discusses anyv.,here are for altegedly counterfeit products. which 
indisputably make up a tmy fraction of the total number of ads at issue in this case. 
Google's position, on the other hand, is that infringement ccnnot be found absent a 
finding that the ads actually displayed on Google.com are likely to confuse consumers as to the 
source of the offered goods. And Google does not believe that Rosetta Stone can satisfy its 
evidentiary burden on the issue of confusion and Google's alleged liability. 
For example, Google believes that ads such as the ones displayed. below (from a search 
resuits page captured April 12, 2010) tnat appear in response to search querie~ for "Rosetta 
Stane'l clearly do not confuse consumers. Other search queries that include (but do not consist 
solely of) Rosetta Stone's marks, such as "Rosetta Stone reviews," "Rosetta Stone at Amazon/' 
or Ulanguage somvare like Rosetta Stone," generate search pages that are also unlikely to 
confuse Google.com users. Not only is there no re~ord evidence to the contrary, but any 
1 
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argument to the contrary is disingenuous. 
Coogle. r.,,,~;;-,_,,,,------~~ 
.. ..... ~. - - .. . 
.. _ . , . • • , ......... .,..... ... _ .. --=., .. -
~ _ . __ . __ .....:.._u ................. r_-... ~--",... ::-... ~ .... , 
:::\'!r:.'f:.·st.. ... 
.. .-..h_ ... .,~ _ 
_'-'--'-
5'f!QUW,,'~-2' 
_ .... __ ................. I , ... _s... r __ ............. .. 
It;'~a.:. .... !~.'-... _ .... .. _ '''' .. _r_eo;.,..., 
--......... , .. ~ 
""" 1 ... "' .... """' .... _ 
--.-
, ..... 'FeY" ''2'''''' ......,..' -....,' ""''8 .. "" :::.:::-........... _n ... ____ . __ 
--_._-_ . ...". . !::::.... 
"··r·,..,"· .......... · ...................... ~._ ....... ~ __ 6!,...-_ --... _ .. ._._ 
.... .-... _---
.. ----. ...--'-.- .-... '. 
If, however, certain search results pages have L'1c.luded infringing ads, the question then 
becomes under what factual circumstances can Google be held secondarily liabie fo r that third· 
party content causing confusion, and whether Rosetta Stone is able to satisfy its evidentiary 
burden of demonstrating that those factual circumstances exist on this record. In other words, 
the ultimate issue before the Court is whether Google's advertising program as a whole can 
infringe Rosetta Stone's marks (Rosetta Stone's position), or whether a more fact~specific 
analysis is required (GoogIe' s position). Google respectfully submits that as a matter of law, the 
record lacks evidence sufficient to support finding of trademark infringement against it. 
RESPONSE TO DISPUTED FACTS 
3 and I!. The documents Rosetta Stone cites to support its assertion that Google's 
2009 policy change was driven only by revenue actually show that Google was first concerned 
about correcting overly generic and spammy-Iooking ads. See Spaziano Exs. I at GOOG-RS-
0251017,2 at GOOG-RS0251048-49. Exhibit 3 does not even mention trademarks at all. 
4. As explained in Google's Objections to Rosetta Stone's Statement of Undisputed 
2 
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Facts ("OSF"), ~ 4, there are many reasons users do not identify sponsored links as ads, 
inciuding that they think ads are intrusive rind sponsored links are not. 
5,8, and 11. As explained in OSF ~ 11, there is no evidence that Google suggested that 
any pCirticular advertiser bid on any particular trademarked keyword, or that it encouraged all 
advertisers to bid on trademarked tenns. There is also no support for Rosetta Stone's assertion 
that Google's Barn Owl tool is "fraught with inaccuT.ac.ies," Of that existence of a manual review 
procedure reflects problems with the too1. 
13. Rosetta Stone is in the best position to identify counterfeiters. OSF 1112, 11. The 
183 ads that Rosetta Stone complains of as for counterfeit goods represent O.Sgolo--less than one 
percent---?fthe ads for which Rosetta Stone's seeks damages, See Declaration ofHcruy Lien in 
Support of Google'sReply Memorandum ("Lien Reply Decl") ~ 3. This is not accurately 
characterized. as "'regular,>! 
14. and 16. There is no evidence that the Google employees addressing counterfeiting 
issues have responsibilities that are "far broader" than enforcing Google's trademark policies. 
Nor is that relevant given Rosetta Stone's admission that the increase in counterfeiting is jn part 
due to Rosetta Stone's increased brand awareness, not Goagle's trademark policy . . Further, only 
three of the 2407 entries in two Rosetta Stone databases related to counterfeiting complaints 
appear to reference Google.com as a possibJe website that was visited prior to purchasing 
sofuvare. Lien Decl Ex. 27 at 263:18-264:12; Declaration of Thai Le in Support of GoogJe's 
Reply Memorandum at ~ 3; Spaziano Ded. El(. 47; see also OSF ~1f 9, 13, 14, 16. 
15 and 17. See OSF ~ 14. 
19. There is no evidence that Google did not take down ads Rosetta Stone identified 
as selling counterfeit goods and using their marks. See OSF V 14; Spaziano Exs. 45-46, 
3 
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Declaration of Bill Lloyd in Support of GoogJe's Reply Memorandum ("Lloyd Reply Dec!.") ~'i[ 
4-&. The ads referenced in Exhibit 2& of the Spaziano declaration use the terms "Stone" or 
URosertall which Rosetta Stone admits arc not its trademarks, and GoogJe omployees thus did not 
take these ads down. Exhibits 30 and 3 J do not show unlawful uses, and Exhibit 29 does not 
refer to a request to take down an ad at all. 
1. GOOGLE IS El'<'TITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGiI>1ENT THAT IT IS NOT 
LIABLE FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGElY1ENT 
A. Google Cannot Be Held Liable For Referential Uses To Genuine Goods. 
Rosetta Stone concedes that it has no monopoly in the words Rosena Stone, yet it seeks 
to prevent Google from allowing third parties to use the words Rosetta Stone for any purpose in 
CotUlcction with advertising on Google. RS Qpp. at 1-2, 14. This anti-competitive ambition runs 
contrary to the central consumer protection goals and fundamental principles of trademark Ja\v. 
Rosetta Stone argues that Google cannot invoke the first sale doctrine, or any other .\\'el1-
established rair use principle of trademark law, simply because of how Google advertising and 
search services are designed, i.e., relevant advertisements are selected and displayed adjacent to 
relevant organic search results based on what a ·user searc?es. even \vhen the search is for a 
trademarked tenn. Id. It is unclear whether Rosetta Stone's position is that third-party 
advertisers are not free to identify genuine Rosetta Stone goods as such-in defiance of a century 
of trademark precedent-or that Google is not permitted to display otherwise legitimate 
advertising according to an algorithmic detennination. But it does not matter. Both theories are 
\V'tong and insufficient to defeat Google's motion. 
Trademark law does not grant a monopoly against all uses of a mark, but only a narrow 
set of uses thai are likely to cause confusion. E.g.. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings, Inc., 
962 F.2d 316,320 (4th CiI. 1992) (quoting: '''trademarks are designed to protectC<lnsumers from 
4· 
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being misled,' not to 'further or perpetuate product monopolies"') (citation omitted). As 
discussed in Google's other briefs, both referential and plain language uses of a trademark are 
lawfuL See Google Mem. Sec. ILA. and Il.C.2j; Google Opp. Sec. LB. Rosetta Stone's 
authorized reseller.s can lawfully advertise that they sell Rosena Stone products; I Rosetta Stone's 
affi liates can lawfully advertise discounts they offer; competitors can lawfully advertise 
comparisons of lheir products to Rosetta Stone's (even in a way that Rosetta Stone docs not 
like); informational sites can lawfuiIy refer to reviews of Rosetta Stone's produciS, and sites 
having nothing to do with language learning can advertise products and services relating to the 
actual Rosetta Stone artifact, stone and marble from foreign countries, and any other 2ds using 
\ 
the plain language meaning of those words. Id. Rosetta Stone cannot use its status as a 
trademark owner to prevent such lawful uses.! 
Rosetta Stone could have chosen, of course, to not have authorized any reseUers or 
affiliates, to differently mark the products available to them, or to contractually restrict their 
advertising. Rosetta Stone cannot use trademark law to achieve what it did not through contract 
law. See Sebastian Int'/, Inc. Y. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1077,0.9 (9th eir. 
1995) C'A trademark is misused if it serves to limit competition in the manufacture and sales of a 
product" and "[b Jec.use [plaintiff] itself placed the collective mark all its products, it is primarily 
responsible for any confusion that resulted from the mark's assertion of affi liation.") . 
I Rosetta Stone seems to argue that the first sale doctrine does not shield its authorized 
reseHer Amazon.com because some unidentified (by name or number) consumers who purchased 
software from Amazon.com were dissatisfied and tried to retum the software to Rosetta Stone. 
A reseUer Ilotoffering a six-month. guarantee and Rosetta Stone not honoring one for all products 
sold through authorized resellers is a contract issue, not a trademark one. 
"E.g., S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Can g., 2d Sess. (1946) ("A trade-mark only gives tl,e right 
to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect toe owner's good will against the sale of another's 
product as his."); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through 
Trademark Use, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1669 (2007). 
5 
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Regarding the first sale doctrine, Rosetta Sione argues that the doctrine does not apply 
because "Google offers the Rosetta Stene rviarks at auction [0 any third party, whether or not a 
reseHer of genuine Rosetta Stone product. These third parties bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks 
and use the Marks in their Sponsored Link texL" RS Opp. at 15. This argument (i) wholly 
ignores that resellers can la'.vIully make referential use of a mark; (ii) incorrectly assumes that 
Google's policies allow anyone to bid or use a mark in a way that violates another'S intellectual 
property rights, when in fact they don't; and (iii) misleadingly suggestS that "any third part,." can 
use Rosetta Stone's marks in the text of an ad on Google.com, when in fact they cannot. 
In other words, Rosetta Stone is simply 'wrong on the law and the facts. Sec Google 
Mem. 8-12,20-21, Google Opp. at 14-18. Google's policies prohibit keyword use that would 
result in trademark infringement, prohibit use of marks in ad text by anyone other than categories 
of advertisers legally entitled to use the marks, such as reseUers. non~competitor review sites, 
and repairers or sellers of compatible paris, and prohibit ads for counterfeit goods. Lloyd Dec!. 
ElCS. 4-5,12; Caruso Dec!., Exs. 3-4. Whether intentionally or not, Rosetla Stone is arguing that 
Google should be held liable for all ads, including tbe display of indisputably lawful ads. This is 
contrary to the law. Without evidence regarding any specific ad that affirmatively implies a false 
affiliation. Google is entitled to summary judgment for all ad for genuine goods. 
B. Google Cannot Be Held Liable For Functional Uses of Marks. 
Google is also entitled to summary judgment on the use of Rosetta Stone's marks as 
keY'vords because they are functional. 
Rosetta Stone argues that the functionality doctrine applies only where a product feature 
is a functional element of the mark holder's product, citing cases between competitors. where the 
product feature was necessari ly present in both parties' produ.cts. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995); TrafflX Devices. Inc. v .. I"lktg. Displays, Inc., 532 
6 
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U.S. 23. 26 (2001)' In those cases, the courts sought to prevent a mark holder from gaining a 
monopoly over functional uses of a mark that "would put competitors at a significant non· 
reputation-related disadvantage." Qua!itex. 514 U.S. at 1.65. Permitting a monopoly on such 
functional uses would "inhibiiO legitimate· cornpetition~' in contravention to trademark law's 
purpOSe of "promot[ing] competition by protecting a firm's reputation." Id at 164. 
The same principles apply here. Google us<::s Rosetta Stone's marks in a purely 
functional way-to identify relevant information to users searching on those words. ~ The fact 
that ads on Google1s website are paid for does not affect the functionality of Google's method of 
ranking their relevance and does not eliminate the functionality of any words, including marks, 
as keywords. Just as Google uses search queries (which may be for trademarked terms or 
generic ones such as ';:Ianguage learning software") to trigger organic search results relevant to a 
user's search, it uses those same queries to trigger relevant ads. Rosetta Stone cannot draw!l 
legally meaningfully distinction between the indexing function of its marks in organic search 
results and Sponsored Links. Trademark law does not prohibit this functional use of words. 
Unlike in Playboy Enterps., Inc. Y. Ner.rcape Com!"c 'ns Corp., where Netscape 
displayed "competitors' unlabeled banner adv~rtisements. with no label or overt comparison to . 
[plaintiff]. after Internet users type in [plaintifi's] trademarks," 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 
2004). Google clearly labels the ads triggered by Rosetta Stone's marie; as "Sponsored Links," 
identifies linked sites by including the visible URL in the ad, and many competitors' ads put a 
reference to Rosetta Stone in context . 
4 Courts have recognized the important informatiQn~providing role search engines like 
Google provide to the public. As one court explained, "it would seem more remarkable still. and 
a pity. if the law, in its over-elCuberant giddiness as it thrashes about with mark-type conflicts in 
cyberspace, should kill such a resource (i.e., readily available Internet directories and search 
engines]." Designer Skin, LLe v. S & L Vitami".s. Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811. 819 n.7 (D. Ariz. 
2008) (citation omitted); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. Y. Welles, 279 FJd 796, 803-04 (9th Cit. 
2002) ("Searchers would have a much more difficult time locating relevant websites if they 
could do so only by correctly guessing the long phrases necessary to substitute for trademarks."); 
Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 Emory L. J. 507 (2005). 
7 
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C. There Is Insufficient Evidence OfCoEfusion To Defeat Googie's Motion. 
Without procf of likelihood of confusion. Rosetta Stone cannot prevail on i~'s 
infringement claims. liThe likelihood of confusion is the lynchpin of infringement." E.g. , 
Cosmetic Dermatology & Vein Centers oj Downrive}'~ Poe. v. New Faces Skin Care Centers, 
Ltd .. 9i F.Supp.2d 1045, 1049 (E.D. Mich. 2000). There is no such evidence here. 
1. Confusion Cannot Be Presumed. 
Rosetta Stone argues dlat «confusion is presumed in cases, such. as this one, involving 
counterfeit marks." RS Opp. at 9. While Rosetta. Stone's desire to presume away irs burden of 
proof is not surprising considering the utter lack of confusion evidence in this record, no 
authority supports doing so here. The presumption cases Rosetta Stone cites addresses only the 
actual counterfeiters' or competitors' use of the plaintiffs mark on their products. None 
presumed confus ion caused by the publisher of an advertisement Where, as here, the 
overwhelming majority of the ads at issue are for genuine goods, confusion cannot be presumed. 
See Shak"peare Co. v. SiIstar Corp. 0/ Am., 110 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 1997) (presumption 
inappropriate where mark described "a functional aspect of the producf'); Anheuser-Busch, 962 
F.2d at 321-22 (presumption inappropriate where mark was used for tile purpose of parody). 
2. Rosetta Stone's "Evidence" Of Confusion Is Illusory. 
Ads For Gelluine Goods Are Nat COli/using. 
There is also no evidence in the record showing that any of the millions of ads that used 
Rosetta Stone's marks to advertise genuine Rosetta Stone products was confusing. Lacking such 
evidence. as part of its generalized attack on Google's business model. Rosetta Stone points to 
two studies: Ca) experiments Gaagle conducted in 2004 concerning any use of a trademark in ad 
text, and (b) a survey conducted by Dr. Van Liere. RS Opp. at 9-13. Neither provides 
meaningful evidence of confusion as to the source of goods offered or the ads themselVes. 
8 
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As a preliminary matter, both studies arc capable of showing nothing more than the first 
step of initial intere:;t confusion-i.e .. what a user thinks aboul'an ad that may lead to clicking on 
the ad. See, e.g., RS Van Lier. Opp. at 19 ("Dr. Van Liere's survey was properly designed to 
test <initial interest confusion' caused by Google's Spoi'lsored Links."); Brewer Decl., Ex. 1; 
Spaziano Decl.~ Exs. 13-15. Neither prcJ:vides any evidence that a user encDuntering even the 
specific ads tested would actually click: on tho~e ads erroneously believing them to be Rosetta 
Stone's website. Indeed. Dr. Van Liere's survey showed that respondents shown the Sponsored 
Links were less confused about which links were official company websites than were those who 
saw only organic listings.' See Blair Decl., Ex. A, at 5·6. Google's 2004 study did not involve 
any ads using the Rosetta Stone marks at QU. Thus. neither provides evidence that initial interest 
confusion actually occurred. See, e.g., Vail Assocs., inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co .. Ltd., 516 F.3 d 853, 
872 (lOth Cir. 2008) ("[A] court caonot simply assume a likelihood of initial interest oonfusion, 
even if it suspects it The proponent of such a theory must prove Ie'). 
Whether Dr not Rosetta Stone can prove initial interest confusion is irrelevant. however, 
because this Circuit does not recognize initial interest confusion as a basis for imposing 
trademark liability in the internet context. Lamparello v. Fa/well, 420 FJd 309, 315-16 (4th Cir. 
S As discussed in Google's briefing on its motion to exclude Dr. Van Liere, his survey is 
deeply flawed in a number of ways. including his misguided approach to testing and measuring 
"endorsement." Smith v. Waf-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2008) 
("Even with regard to the tested concepts, the Court finds that the sl4cvey was so flawed that it 
does not create a genuine issue of material fact"). Among other errors, Dr. Van Liere counted as 
confused respondents who identified as "endorsed by Rosetta Stone" ads by Amazon.com and 
Coupon Cactus, which, ilJdisputably~ were an authorized reseller and premium affiliate 
(respectively) of Rosetta Stone at the time the tested ads actu;;lly ran. Caruso Decl., Exs. 19,42-
43,66 at 166:14-24, 176:2-14; Blair Dec1. ~~ 15-19, Ex. A at 9. [fDr. Van.Liere'ssurvey results 
were otherwise left intact and these two categories of respondents were properly classified as not 
confused, the "net confusion" of the survey would be -3%-i.e., fewer people who saw the 
Sponsored Links were "confused" than those who did not. BI,';r Decl. 1 18. 
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2005). As the Fourth Circuit explained: "[Wle have r.eycr adopted the initial interest confusion 
theory; rather. we h~ve followed a verI different mode of analysis, requiring courtS to detennine 
whether a likelihood of confusion exists by examining the allegedly infringing lise in (he context 
in \lihich it is seen by th.e ordinQ;Y consumer." Lampar{!.J/o, 420 F.3d at 316 (internal quotation 
omitted, emphasis in original). Such analysis requires looking not only to the allegedly 
infringing use giving rise to the purported initial interest confu5ion, such as a domain name or ad, 
"but also to the underlying [content] of the website." Id. at 318; see also Carl v. 
b"rnQrdjcarl.com, 662 F.Supp. 2d 487, 496 (E.D. Va. 2009) (rejecting the initial interest 
confusion theory as not accepied by the Fourth Circuit). Even jf initial IDter!::st confusion were 
cognizable in this Circuit and on these facts (neither of which is true), such would not be an 
actionable theory of direct liability against Google becal.,lSe Google "does not compete with the 
markholder for sales." Lamparel/o, 420 F.3d at J 17; see also id. at 317 n.6 (noting adverse First 
Amendment consequences to unwarranted expansion of initia l interest confusion). 
ii Rosetta Stone's "Evidence" Concerlling Ads For Allegedly 
Counterfeit Goods Is Insufficient to Defeat Google's .Motioll. 
Lacking any confusion evidence concerning ads for genuine goods, Roset'";4 Stone 1atches 
on to the fact that some ads on Google.com were allegedly for counterfeit goods ",ith the hope 
that the existence of those ads will lead the Court to shut down all advertising using Rnsetta 
Stone's marks, however legitimate. The gulf betvleen the number of ads Rosetta Stone alleges to 
be counterfeit and the scope of the liability it seeks to impose is stunning. In its Opposition, 
Rosett.a Stone identifies 182 ads that it contends were for counterfeit goods. RS Opp. at 20, 
referencing Calhoun DecL Ex. C. These represent O.S9%--less than one percent--of the ads 
that Rosetta Slone seeks damages for. Lien Decl. ~ 3 lfRosetta Stone could prove each of these 
ads offered counterfeit products and resulted in actionable confusion, that would still be 
10 
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insufficient to hold Google directly liable. Indeed, in Tiffany (:oIJ) Inc. v . • Bay Iroc., where the 
plaintiff asserted that up to 75% of the listings using its trademark were for counterfeit products: 
the Second Circuit a.ffirmed that such listings were wholly irrelevant to the question of eBay's 
direct infringement. No. 08-3947-cv, 2010 WL [236315, '2, '7 (2d Cir. Apr. 1,2010). 
Even if otherwise relevant, Rosetta Stone's "evidence" falls short of establishing 
confusion. First, Rosetta Stone must prove that each ad it contends offered counterfeIT goods 
actually did so-as opposed to, for example, genuine products acquired througb individual retail 
sale. surp lus acquisition, or international purcba.o;Co.c Giving Rosetta. Stone the benefit of every 
possible inference in its favor, the most Rosetta Stone can possibly prove is that five indiyiduals 
purchased actual counterfeit products after visiting Google.com. See RS Opp. at 10-11, n.S. 
This is de minimus as a matter of law. George & Co .. LLC v. imagination Enlrn 't Ltd., 575 FJd 
383, 398-99 (4th Cir. 2009) (affinning that four instances of actual confusion among 500,000 
units sold was de minimis evidence of confusion). 
Rosetta Stone tries to hide the de minirnus nattire of its evidence with self-serving 
declarations and interrogatory responses and the testimony of Google lawyers concerning screen 
shots presented at their depositions. RS Opp. at 11-12; see Spaziano Opp. Decl. Ex. 38, Calhoun 
DeGI. This effort is unavailing. The documents referenced in Mr. Calhoun's Declaration reveal 
that!!.!!!!!!. of those records of complaints identified Google as the means by which the allegedly 
counterfeit prodncts were located. Le Decl. at 1~3-4. In COntras~ the records identify other 
soutces such Craigslist and spam email, which cannot be tied to Google's Sponsored Links. [d. 
, E.g. , Microsoft v. MBC Enters., 120 Fed. Appx. 234, 237-38 (lOth Cir. 2004) 
(reversing summary judgment premised on erroneous finding of counterfeits) (unpublished); 
Microsoft Corp. v. Ram Distrib., LLC, 625 F. Supp. 2d 674, 682 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (denying 
summary judgment to plaintiff that failed to provide sufficient evidence that products at issue 
were counterfeit). . 
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Thus, Rosetta Stone's remaining :'evidence" amounts to mere speculation. and conjecture) \vhich 
is insufficient to defeat Google's motion. 
Rosetta Stone's efforts to manufacture evidence of confusion through depositions of 
Google's lawyers is likewise inadequate. Without any foundation that Ms. Chen or Ms. Hagan 
were among "those purchasers most likely to partake of the alleged infringer's goods or 
services," they cannot be counted as confused. AmSlar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, inc., 615 F.2d 
252, 264 (5th Cir. 1980). Also, when Rusetta Stone's counsel asked them to identify which 
I"; 
. :. 
Sponsored Links on a printed screen shot offered Rosetta Stone's products for sale, both 
i. j responded that they could not tell for certain without more information, and then . identified 
which ads claimed [0 offer Rosetta Stone products. See Google Opp. OSF 18. Being uncertain 
about the source of a product referenced in an ad does not evidence confusion; it reflects 
a.wareness that more infonnatian is nece.ssary_ E.g. , Nora Beverages. Inc. v. Perrier Group of 
Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[nquiries about the relationship between an owner 
I., of a mark and an alleged infringer do not amount to actual confusion. Indeed. such inquiries are 
, . arguably premised upon a lack of confusion between Lie products sucb. as to inspire the inquiry 
I 
L itself"). Thus, even this additional so-called confusion evidence cannot defeat Google's motion. 
3. Relevant Likelihood of Confusion Factors Disprove Confusion. 
As discussed above, use of Rosetta Stone' s marks in connection with the sale of genuine 
goods is lawful to refer (0 Rosetta Stone. Traditional likelihood-of-confusion factors are not 
designed to address such uses because they do not involve passing off. E.g., Century 21 Real 
Estate Corp. v. LendingTree. inc., 425 F.3d 211,224-25 (3d Cir. 2005). 
i However, if the Court deems it appropriate to consider factors other than Ros~tta Stone's 
( - lack of evidence of actual confusion, which both parties agree is the most important 
consideration (sa RS Mem. at 20), Google respeclfully submits that two other factors may bear 
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on the likelihood of confusion anaiysis hero: Google's intent and the sophistication of the 
relevant market. Both favor Google and support 5ummary judgment in its favor. 
There is no dispute about the facts relating to Google's intent-just how the law should 
apply to them. As tho record makes clear, Google' s policies have always prohibited ads for 
counterfeir goods; Google has always prohibited ads that violate the intellectual property rights 
of others; Gaagle has alway, re'panded to Rosetta Stone's complaints of uses of its marks that 
were not in compliance with Google's policies; Google has assisted Rosetta Stone in its efforts to 
track down foreign and domestic criminals; and Google is motivated tD h3ve users pleased with 
the ads displayed on Google.com and therefore works to make those ads a positive experience-
which ads for counterfeit products undennine. Google Opp. OSF 9. Further, Google's 
trademark policies have always been comfortably within the bounds permitted by law, as 
confIrmed by briefing in this action-and 'by Rosetta Stone's efforts to lobby for legislative 
changes to prohibit the presently lawful use of trademark terms as keywords. Caruso Decl., Ex. 
77 at 195:3-196:1; Ex. 51 at 218:15-219:25; Exs. 36-39 . . 
Rosetta Stone responds to these facts with one sentence in a footnote thal "Google 
knowingly and willfully used th~ Rosetta Stone Marks in a manner that would drive internet 
traffic away from Rosetta Stone and to the sites of its other customers." RS Opp. at 13 n.7. The 
actual evidence Rosetta Stone relies on. however. tcHs a different story. It reflects that Google 
was aware that competition for trademark tenns could increase cost per click rates for trademark 
owners, but does not contain any hiilt of knowledge-much less intent-that traffic would be 
diverted from the site of any trademark owner. Spaziana Exs. 38-40. Rosetta Stone ca!Uw! use 
unfounded and indirect inferences of intent to defeat Google's summary judgment motion, See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, . 255 (1986) (requiring only "justjfiable 
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inferences" be drawn in the non-movanCs favor). 
In its Opposition: Rosetta Stone does not contest that "sophistication and expertise of the 
usual purchasers can preclude any likelihood of confusion among them stemming from the 
similarity of trade names ." Perini Corp. v. Perini CDl)Str. Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir. 
1990). Nor does it attempt to distinguish the cases Google cited in it opening brief (Goog. Mem. 
at 18) for the proposition that COJ15umers making purchases in the $20 range were sophisticated. 
Instead, Rosetta Stone asserts. without any support whatsoever, that "the relevant market is 'the 
public at large.'" RS Opp. at 13 n.7. That is contradicted by the undisputed record. Rosetta 
Stone software retails for approximately $229 for a single level and $509 for a three level 
bundle. Google Opp. GSF 19. Consumers carefully deliberate before purchesing foreign 
language software, and Rosetta Stone's custoiners have higher income and educ~tiDnal levels 
than tbe "public at Jarge." ld In addition~ even to encounter th~ situation that Rosetta Stone 
posit~ is confusing (Le. a search results page for a query containing a Rosetta Stone mark), a user 
must have unaided recall ofthe Rosetta Stone mark. Caruso Deel., Exs. 34-35,60 at 119:5-20, 
69 at 86:20-88: l. In other words, Rosetta Stone's claim that the relevant market is "the public at 
large" is factually and legally implausible on this record and th is factor strongly favors Google. 
II. ROSETTA STONE OFFERS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR HOLDING GO OGLE 
SECONDARlL Y LIABLE FOR TRADElvlARKINFRINGEMENT. 
Secondary liabilit-j ' for trademark infringement is reserved for those who take a very 
active role in the infringing conduc~, i.e., knowing and intentional assistance of the direct 
infringement. Simply pu~ to impose secondary liability for trademark infringement, the 
defendant must be in cahoots with the infri.'1ger. The record offers no such evidence here. 
A- Google Does Not Induce Infringement Of Rosetta Stone's Marks. 
Rosetta Stone cannot prove that Google intended for a third party to infringe Rosetta 
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Stone's marks. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. lves Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 860 (!982) (White, 1., 
concurring). In opposition to Google's motion. Rosetta Stone does not cite a single piece of 
evidence demonstrating inducement; it simply asserts that "GoQgle intentionally induces 
customers to bid on trademark tenns as ke)'\\'ord triggers' and to use trademark tenns in the text 
and title of Sponsored Links." RS Opp. at 19. Even if true, this faUs far short of proof that 
Google intended for anyone to infringe Rosetta Stone's marks. Rosetta Stone cites no authority. 
and we are aware of none, that holds a company vica.riously liable for trademark infringement as 
a result of providing neutral tools, such as those containing information reflecling actual 
advertiser and user behavior on Google. In contrast. the defendant in Bauer Lamp Co., Inc., \I. 
Shaffer) did not merely uask" a lamp manufacturer to manufacture the infringing lamps, he did so 
as part of a personal vendetta to "even the score"-with the plainiiff. with the goal of selling an 
identical lamp at a lower price and putting him out of business. 941 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (111J:t 
Cir. 1991). Indisputably, there are no such facts here. A..,d Transdermal Prods. Inc. v. 
Paiformance Contract Packaging, Inc. was essentially a ruling on the sufficiency of the 
pleadings determining that a third party that "could be liBble" on a theory of contributory 
infringement could be joined under Rule 14. 943 F. Supp. 551, 554 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
B. Google Does Not Supply Its Product To Anyone It Knows To Infringe. 
After Google filed.its opening brief, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in Tiffany (NJ) 
Inc. v .• Bay, Inc., which affmned a case relied on by Google for the proposition th.t whcn an 
alleged secondary infri.nger has taken "appropriate steps to cut off the supply of its product or 
services to the infringer," courts should decline to impose contributory liability_Tiffany Inc. v. 
eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463,516 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), afJ'dNo. 08-3947-cv, 2010 WL 1236315, 
*7 (2d Cir. Apr. I, 2010). Incredibly, Rosetta Stone argues that the Second Circuit's opinion 
somehow supports its position, RS Opp: at 20, despite cBay not being held liable for the sale of 
IS 
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counterfeit Tiffany products· on eBay.ccm of which it was not specifically aware. Rosetta 
Stone's erroneous reliance en Tiffany here ignores the extent of eBay involvement in the 
cou~terfeit li stings at issue 1 and the pervasiveness of those listings. both of which were orders of 
magnitude greater than present in the instant action. Tiffany, 2010 WL 1236315, at *2. 
Rosetta Stone's ipse dixit assertion that Google had better reason to know the identity of 
counterfeiters than eBay did, RS Opp. at <,0 , is wholly unsupported. It is unreasonable to expect 
that Google check WHOIS for every one of the millions of Ad\Vords accoW1ts created per year. 
for each domain displayed in each individual ad created by those millions of advertisers, and 
Google does not. Lloyd Decl. .~~ 10. Nor does it have any legal obligation to. As such, Rosetta 
Stone's examples of three ads, each with separate and distinet URLs (RS Opp. at 21 -22), and 
each with different advertiser contact information, are insufficient to prove that Google should 
have known that any single advertiser of alle&edly counterfeit products whose ads were 
displayed was the same advertiser responsible for other ads. 
C. Google Does Not Vicariously Infringe.Rosetta Stone's lVlarks. 
To prevail on a claim of vicarious trademark infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove that 
Google and the direct infringers ,uhave an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind 
one anotber in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the 
infringing product." Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'/ Servo Assoc., 494 FJd 788, 807 (9th Cir. 
Briefi ng in that action reflects that eBay ( l) made its most effective keywords 
available to sellers during conference calls and specifically identified 'Tiffany" as one of the top 
searcbec\ keywords, (2) identified "Tiffany" as a "hof' keyword in the Jewelry and Watches 
category, (3) identified "Tiffany" in its "Holiday Hot Lisf' provided to sellers, (4) encouraged 
sellers to view its Pulse webpage that includes the top searches and most watched items, both of 
which included "Tiffany" and "Tiffany & Co." at various times, and (5) reimbursed affiliates for 
sponsored links that advertised the sale of Tiffany jewelt)' on eBay. Lien Decl. Ex I, Plaintiff's 
Post Tria! Memorandum, D/Q 74 at 6-l0. Further, Tiffany submitted m OTe than 284,000 notices 
of claimed infringement to eBay concerning counterfeits. Jd. at 14-. 
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2007) (quoting Hard Rock Cafe Licensil1g Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 
(7th Cir. 1992)). The record contains no facts showing that Google has the requisite level of 
partnership, joint ownership, or joint control over any alleged infringing ads. 
The few eoure to address vicarious tradema.rk infringement have interpreted the test qUlte 
rigorously. In the seminal Hard Rock decision, the Seventh Circuit grounded the concept of 
vicarious trademark liability in •. joint-tortfeasor theory. 955 F.2d at 1150. Relying on the Hard 
Rock test, other courts have concluded that "the essence of joint tortfeasor liability is fault-joint 
tortfeasors are all persons who act in concert (0 commit a tort, pw·suant io Q common purpose. ". 
AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F. 3d 1421, 1441 n.22 (3d. Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added) (ciling McCarthy on Trademarks 25.03[1) al 25-35); see a/so Fare Deals. 
LTD., v. WorldChoic, Travel.com,·jnc., 180 F. Supp .. 2d 678, 684-85 (D. Md. 2001) (examining 
vicarious liability in the context of agency law and principlesj. Notwithstanding the GEICO 
court's determination that a vicarious claim should not be dismissed on the pleadings, absolutely 
no precedent supports applying this rare ly invoked theory to Google"s actions here, where there 
is no evidence of Google acting in concert with anyone to infringe Rosetta Stone's rnarkss. 
III. GOOGLE QUALIFIES FOR THE rNNOCENT PUBLISHER DEFENSE 
Recognizing the inevitable chilling effect of holding liable for d.mages publishers, with 
no wrongful knowledge or inrent, for their publication of an infringing or false ad created by 
a~other, Congress provided a limitation on damages in such instances. 15 U.S.C. 1114(2)(B).' 
S As Rosetta Stone admits, its state common law trademark and unfair competition claims 
ri ,e and fall with its Lanham Act claims. RS Opp at 24 n.13. Accordingly, Google is entitled to 
summary judgment on those too. 
, u[T)rademark lows ... often raise difficult questions about freedom of speech" and the 
revisions in the innocent publisher defense asetO forth critical const~tutional protections" by 
(footnote continued) 
17 
6587 
.,. ", 
I ' 
: -~ 
, , 
... :< 
, .; 
This limitation applies here, where as discussed in Sections I.C'} and II.B, Google does not 
kno\ ... ·ingly peQIlit ads for counterfeit goods and indisputably takes down those it is notified of. 
Caruso DecL Ex. 21; Ex. 23-25; Ex. 28; Ex. 65, 135: 11-138:25; Ex. 72; Calhoun Decl., Ex. C . 
Rosetta Stone argues that Google cannot quali~ for this limitation because of various 
steps it [Qok to encourage advertising. RS Opp. at 28. This is incorrect. Under this logic, if any 
publisher promoted the availability of advertising opportunities for its publication. it would lose 
the statutory protection. Imposin~ lia.bility for damages without any specific knowledge or 
encouragement of unlawful ads would defeat the very purpose of the statute. Here, no evidence 
of such knowledge or encouragement exists. Iv Google Opp. aSF 9. 
IV. ROSETTA STONE'S DILUTION CLAIlVI FAlLS 
Rosetta Stone concedes that Google -does nOl use Rosetta Stone's marks to identify 
Google's own goods and services. RS Opp. at 25. As such, Google cannot be held liable for 
dilution. See Tiffany, 2010 WL 1236315 at *15 (holding that "insofar as eBay did not itself sell 
the goods at issue, it did not itself engage in dilution"). 
Even if Google could theoretically be held liable for dilution, it cannot on this record. 
Rosetta Stone's assertion that its marks were famous in 2004 (RS Opp. at 25) is entirely 
contradicted by its own records showing i{ had brand a\\'areness of less than 16% in 2005, a year 
"ex:empt[ing1 from liability 'innocent' disseminators of offending material ." Remarks of 
Subcommittee Chaiman Robert Kastenmeier, 134 Congo Rec. HI 0420 (Oct. 19, 1988). 
10 Further, the relevant facts here are identical to Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., where the 
court denied injunctive relief "because cBay has stopped running all the advertisements claimed 
to be infringing and it has no intention of rUi1l1ing th2 identifie.d advertisements in the future." 
165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2001)(emphasi>added)_ Google bas done the same. 
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after the allegedly dilutive behavior began. Caruso DecL Ex~. 3Ip33.11 That is clearly not what 
the Anti-Dilution Act contemplates. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) ("{A] mark is famous if it is 
widely recognized by the general consuming public . . .. "); McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition, §24:106 (suggesting that for a mark to ·be famous it must have at least 75% 
:lwareness in a sur/ey of the general consuming public). Nor has Rosetta Stone proven, or even 
offered a plausible L1COry of how, Google's actions are likely to harm its trademark. See 15 
U.S.C. §il25(c](l ) (usc of a mark must be "likely to cau~e dilution by blurring or dilution by 
tarni~hment). Indeed. the record is to the contrary. Rosetta Stone's brand equity has improved 
since 2004, and even [he five individuals who allegedly purchased counterfeit Rosetta Stone 
products continue 10 have a positive impression of Rosetta Stone. Spaziano Dec!., Tab A. at 
Dubow 45:1-46:2, Jeffries 40: 11-41:20, Doyle 25:10-22, Porter 41:14-24, Thomas 29:19-30:17. 
v. ROSETIA STONE'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM FAILS 
The parties agn:e that to prevail on en unjust enrichment claim, Rosetta Stone must prove 
that (I) it conferred a benefit on Google; (2) Google Imew of the benefit ar.d should have 
reasonably expected to repay Rosetta Stone for it; and (3) Google sceepted or retained the 
benefit without paying for its value. RS Opp. at 26. It cannot. 
First, Google has not "taken" any benefit from Rosetta Stone. A trademark owner has no 
property right<i in its mark beyond the right to prevent conSUmer confusion as to source of its 
goods. See. e.g.. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (nA trade-mark only gives the 
right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of 
another's product as his."). U!lless Google's actions violate Rosetta Stone's trademark rights, 
II Nor does Rosetta Stone's theory that nGoogle uses the Rosetta Stone.Mark because 
they are famous" salvage its dilution. Any word can be bid on as a keyword; if Rosetta Stono 
were correct that mere use of a word as a keY'\'ord proved fame. all marks ~ould be "famous." 
19 
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Rosetta Stone has no proof that Google took any benefit that rightfully belonged to Rosetta 
Stone. Rosetta Stone cites no contrary cases. 12 
Second, Rosetta Stone concedes [ha~ there is no evidence that Google promised to pay 
anything for the use of Rosetta Stone's marks; ins tea.d. it contends that the promise can be 
implied. RS Opp. at 27. Roset'", Stone cites no cases with comparable facts in support of this 
assertion,l) which is contrary to the general rule that U[o]ne may not recover under a theory of 
implied contract simply by showing a benefit to lhe defendant, without adducing other facts to 
raise an implication that the defendant promised [0 pay the plaintiff for such benefit" New-ich \I. 
JOl1es, 245 Va. 465, 476 (1993). Accordingly, Google is entitled to summary judgmenl 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and upon all papers submitted in connection with the Google's 
briefing of the parties' summary judgment motions, Google respectfully requests that its Motion 
For Summary Judgment be granted. 
lsi 
Ionathan D. Frieden, Esquire (VSB No. 41452) 
Stephen A. Cobb, Esquire (VSB No. 75876) 
ODIN, FELDMAN & PIITLEMAN, P_C. 
9302 Lee Highway, Suite 1100 
.Fairfax, Virginia 22031 
(703) 218-2100 
Ro-spectfully Submitted, 
GOOGLEINC. 
By counsel 
12 Having conceded that its contract with Google "delineated w~t Rosetta agreed to pay 
Google," Rosetta Stone has apparently abandoned the allegations of its unjust eruichment claim 
that "[tJhrough the auction of Rosetta Stone's trademarks Google unjustly derived a benefit from 
Rosetta Stone in the fonn of higher payments from Rosetta Stone." First Amended Comp.1123. 
" Unlike in the cases cited by Rosetta Stone, Google did not benefit from any utilities or 
professional services rendered by Rosetta Stone of the ty;oe for which there is usually a fee 
arrangement or compensation, nor did jt publish a work·ofRosetta Stone's without permission. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTER."N DISTRICT OF VIRGIN!A 
(Alexandria Divisi~n) 
ROSETTA STONE LTD. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
, 
;. CIVIL ACTION NO. I :09cv736 
: (GBLITCB) 
, 
GOOGLE INC. 
Defendant. 
DECLARATION OF BILL LLOYD 
~ William ("Bill") Lloyd, ·hereby declare: 
L l oam currently employed as Team Le.ad-L~gal Advertising Support by Google 
Inc. ("Go ogle"}. I make this declaration in support of Google's Reply Memorandum in Support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment in the matter caption<?ri Rosetta Stone Ltd. \I Google. Inc., 
Civil Action No.1 :09-cy-736 (E.D. Va.). I am over the age of eighteen. I know ~"e facts stated 
herein of my own personal knowledge alldlor my re\~ew o"f b~tness recards. If called to testify 
as a witness: "I could and would do so competently end under oath. 
2. As part of my duties as Team Lead. I am familiar with, and assist in the· 
enforcement of. Google's trademark and co~terfeit policies. 
3. I have been asked to review the actions taken by Google m response to several 
complaints it received from Rosetta Stone. 
4. By consulting the trademark complaint database where Google stores information 
regarding trademark complaints. as well as corresponding conununications and our internal 
policy enforcement lool, I deternlined lhat Google received a complaint from Rosetta Stone on 
February 2, 2010, regarding an advertisement displaying the website address 
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cheaprosettostoneonsaie.com. Google processed this complaint on February 3, 2010, and the 
advertisement was subsequently removed. 
5. I also consulted the trademark complaint da!abasc where Google.siores 
information regarding trademark complaints and.determined that Google receive~ a complaint 
.• 
from Rosetta Stone on February 2,2010 regarding an aovertisemeni displaying the website 
address rosettastonemaUs.com. Googie processed this complaint on February-3, 2010 and the 
advertisement. was removed. : 
Ii. An email with the bates number RS-Oll·002420 reflects that Google received a 
complaint from Rosetta Stone on September 24, 2009 regarding an advertisement displaying the 
website address dvdmallonline.com. · This email ",as sent through the Risk Team and not·through 
the official trademark or counterfeit complaint process. Therefore the co~plaint was not logged 
into Goagle's trademark complaint database. However, according to GoogLe's reCords. that 
·advertisement did not run after the date that Google received the complaint (i .e., September 24, 
2009). 
7. A document bates numbered RS·O 11-008031 refieots that Rosetta Stone's 
complaints about the advertisemeuI.s rlisplaying the webSite addrc.'Sses 
gamsoftmall.oomirosettastoneColorado, and gainsofhnali.com/rosettastone, aUegedly seiling 
counterfeit goods, WeTe sent t~ Google throUgh the Risk Team and not through the official 
trade~ark or counterfeit complaint process. The accounts and ads in question-were s~speaded; 
however) the URLs were not automatically flagged, or logged into Google's trademark 
complaint database because Rosetta Stone did not use the right q>mplaint process. If Google had 
. received Rosetta Stone's complaint through the fonnal process, Google would have flagged and 
prohibited the URL indefinitely. 
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8. I also looked at the our internal policy enforcement taol regarding the 
advertisements displaying the websi te ?ddresses hotmallstore.com, hotmartforyou.com, ana 
hotma1l2u.com. Google's precessing ofa complaint for one ofthese URLs did not prevent 
display of ads with links to the others because they had qifferent URLs. Once \ .... e r~ct:!ved 
, . 
i complaints related to the other two URLs, they were also flagged so that further ads for them 
could not be shown. 
9. As part of the trademark team's investigation oftrade:mark and counte-rfeit 
complaints, it does not routinely check the WHOIS registration of URLs. 
10. Queries ofGoogJe's records reve;)l that in the past year, millions of AclWGids 
accounts have been created. There have been trillions of ad impressions displayed On 
Google.com since 2004. 
r declare Wlder penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executoo on 
Aprii 14,2010 at Mountain View, California. 
i..: 
j : • 
... ; 
Bill Lloyd 
i· : 
L: 
i ,. 
6596 
., 
IN THE UNITED STATES mSTRlCT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
(Ale"ndria Division) 
ROSETTA STONE LTD. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GOOGLE INC. 
Defendant 
, 
: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:09cv736 (G8L1 
: TCB) 
DECLARATION OF THAI LE IN SUPPORT OF GOOGLE INC.'S REPLY IN 
FURTHER SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGNlENT 
I, Thai Le, declare as follows : 
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age. r am an ilssociate at the law firm 
Quin" Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel of record for Defendant Goagle, Inc. 
("Googie"), in this action. I make this declaration in suppOrt of Googlels Reply [n 
Further Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. I have personal knowledge of , he 
facts stated herein as set forth below and if called to testify: could and would competently 
testify thereto. 
2. On April 9, 2010, [submitted a declaration in support afGoogle's 
Opposition to Rosetta Stone's Motion for Partial SummE.ry Judgment. In that declaration, 
I describe my review of voluminous records produced. by Rosetta Stone in this litigation 
as a collection of documents bates labeled RS·OI4·009601 (the Pararurc data ), and 
documents bates labeled RS-OI4-000038 to RS·OI4-009600 (the Quickbase data), which 
records are referenced by the Declaration of Jason Calhoun in Support of Rosetta Stone's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability filed March 26, 2010. 
3: I reviewed all of the provided Parature and Quickbase data, and note the 
following: 
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3_ None of the Parature data references Google as a website that was 
visited as pat1 of the purchase of an allegedly counterfeit product or mentions 
UGoogie," "search," or "sponsored link." 
b. None of the 2)46 Quickbase din. records references the use of 
Google's Sponsored Links to purchase a product. 
c. Only three of the total 0[2407 entries in the Parature and 
Quickbase data combined appear to contain any reference to Gaogle.com as a 
website that was visited prior 10 purchase. The data from these entries is ~e[ forth 
in the tables below. 
Record ID#: 1514 
Date Reported 1111012009 
Case Management Loo 
Comments 
General Comments Software would not activate, contacted RS cust ser, 
advised item was pirated 
... 
Keywords 
Phase 1 Status Closed - Archived 
Price $139 
Priority I Severity 3 
Product Description Spanish LA ver3/ 1·2-3 
Product Received by customer yes 
Product Received by Rosetta no 
Stone 
.. -
Product Received by RS from no 
Customer 
Purchased bv customer yes 
~~ased bv Rosetta Stone no 
Reporters Address 
Report~sCompmyName 
Report~s Email Address docceliot@latLnet 
Reporters F a."'< Number 
Reporter's Name David G. Eliot 
Reporter's Phone Number (317)413-8646 
Reporter's relationship to Pirate first time purchaser 
RS Response (email) 
--_ .. 
Seller Address 
-Seller Email http://newezstore.com 
2 
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Seller lD 
Seller Name 
Seller Phone 
URL (where is the producr 
offered?) 
Venue 
Webpaee 
Date Created 
Date Modified 
Last Modified By 
Record Owner 
Record ID# 
Date Re orted 
Case Mana eme.. ... ll La 
Comments 
General Comments 
Keywords 
Phase I Status 
Price 
.R1j9rity I Severity 
-I;roduct Description 
Product Received by customer 
Product Received by Rosetta 
Stone 
Product Received by RS from 
Customer 
Purchased by customer 
Purchased by Rosetta Stone 
Reporter's Address 
Reporter's Company Name 
Rejlorter's Email Address 
DVD Reliable & Professional DVDs Store 
....... -
Intemet/google 
11110/200916:22 
11124/2009 10:48 
Michael Hill <56768272.ebdp> 
Anonvmous <l.ckbs> 
1772 
1/20/2010 
We purchased this in the fall off the internet when we 
had googled for rosetta stone spllnish 1,2) & this was 
offered at a low price. We began after Christmas here 
in OUf homeschool, and after 2 lessons, can move on 
no further as we need an activation #, there is no card 
whatsoever in the box ... upon calling your service 
technicians, they suggested (0 report this. Trus 
. product came from China, whic,h we did not realize at 
all when we were-ordering ... so the return address, 
etc .. .. are aU in Chinese. What can we, do about this? 
This is terribly upsetting and discouraging. Can you 
help us wirh this? We can send you the shipping label 
or whatever you need. 
Paid AD Pirates (possible) 
Researching 
$184 
3 
Rosetta Stone SpilIlish 1.2.3 
no 
no 
no 
; yes 
no 
"WI8111 Prairie Road East 
Osseo, WI 54758" 
momingstar@triwest.net 
3 
I j 
] 
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L R"JlOrter's Fax Number (715) 695-3971 
-I Reporte~_s Name I Peggl Becker 
Reponer's Phone Number I (715) 695-3957 
Reporter's relationship to Pirate none 
RS Response (email) 
Seller Address Chinele symbols 
Seller Email 
Seller ID 
Seller Name All in Chinese symbols 
Seller Phone 
--
j (TRL (where is the product I Intemet offered?) 
Venue , , 
Webp.ge , 
Date Created \ /201201 0 13:08 
Date Modified 3110120 108:46 
Last Modified By Michael Hill <56768272_ebdp> 
Record Owner Anonvrnous <l .ckbs> 
Record ID# 2062 
---
Date Reported 1/17/2010 
Case Management Log "senr victim a letter for bank. 
counterfeit in cabinet 
.. 
Comments 
General Comments 
Keywords google paid ad pirates 
Phase I Status Closed - Archived 
Price $158 
Priority I Severity 3 
Product Description Rosetta Stone Latin American Spanish (Used) 
Product Received bv customer yes 
Product Received by Rosetta yes 
Stone 
Product Received by RS from yes 
Customer 
Purchased by customer yes 
Purchased by Rosetta Stone no 
... _ .. .. 
Reporter's Address "718 S_ 13th St 
fairview, OK 73737 
" 
Reponer's Company Name 
Reporter's Email Address thamen!al.sbcgolbaLcom 
Reporter's Fax Number 
4 
6601 
.. 
.. 
.. 
Reportets Name I Donita Hamen 
Reportets Phone Number (580) 227-0893 
Reporter's relationship to Pirate I 
_. 
RS Response (email) 
SeUer Address 
SeUer Email toprosettasrone@)lOtmail.com 
SeUer ID 
SeUer Name 
SeUer Phone 
URL (where is the product www.toprosettastone.com 
offered?) 
Venue t 
.... 
, 
Webpaae ~ Date Created 2i17i2010 11:23 Date Modified 21171201011:23 
Last Modified By Michael Hill <56768272.ebdp> 
':J Record Owner Michael Hill <56768272.ebdp> 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California and the Commonwealth of 
Virginia that the foregoing is [rue and correct and that this Declaration was executed on 
April 14, 2010, at Redwood Shores. California. 
·Thai Le 
5 
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